PHARMACIST STEVE

It would appear that the various state AGs suing the 3 major drug wholesalers over their involvement in contributing to our fabricated opioid crisis.  This lawsuit did not go to trial, it was handled by a committee of state AGs and a Federal judge and mediation. Everyone was on salary paid for by the taxpayers, and all the negotiations/mediation was done BEHIND CLOSED DOORS. It looks like they may have done things this way, so that they would not have to “split the loot” from the lawsuit with some law firm.

 

 

who was the law firm involved with the 45 state AGs that acted as prosecutor law firm?

The law firm that acted as the prosecutor or lead coordinating counsel for the 45 (or 55) state attorneys general in the major multistate opioid settlements—such as those involving Purdue Pharma and the Sackler family—was not a single private law firm, but rather the legal teams within the offices of the state attorneys general themselves, often coordinated by an executive committee of AGs from several key states. These AG-led teams collectively acted as “the law firm” representing the states, exercising their powers to prosecute civil enforcement actions against opioid manufacturers and distributors.[1][2]

In some other opioid litigation, specific private law firms such as The Lanier Law Firm were retained by certain states, or worked closely with AGs and trial lawyers in supporting roles, but in the broad, coordinated actions on behalf of the 45 or more state AGs, prosecutorial authority resided within the AG offices and their appointed committees—not an outside firm.[2][3][1]

[1](https://www.troutman.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/The20Robust20Use20of20Previously20Ignored20States20Powers.pdf)
[2](https://www.naag.org/issues/opioids/)
[3](https://www.lanierlawfirm.com/practice-areas/pharmaceutical-liability/opioid-lawsuits/)
[4](https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/news/2025/6/16/pr25-36.html)
[5](https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2025/attorney-general-james-announces-every-state-has-joined-74-billion-settlement)
[6](https://www.mass.gov/news/55-attorneys-general-sign-on-to-74-billion-purdue-settlement)
[7](https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-action/ag-sunday-announces-historic-settlement-with-purdue-pharma-and-sackler-family-regarding-manufacture-distribution-of-opioids-that-fueled-addiction-epidemic/)
[8](https://www.law.alaska.gov/press/releases/2025/061625-Purdue.html)
[9](https://journals.law.harvard.edu/jlpp/wp-content/uploads/sites/90/2021/01/Cordova-Parens-Patriae.pdf)
[10](https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2024/attorney-general-james-secures-150-million-multistate-settlement-principle-hikma)
[11](https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-signs-74-billion-purdue-settlement)
[12](https://www.doj.state.or.us/media-home/news-media-releases/attorney-general-dan-rayfield-secures-720-million-from-eight-opioid-drug-makers/)
[13](https://goultralaw.com/tools/opioid-settlement-calculator-for-individuals/)
[14](https://oag.dc.gov/release/attorney-general-schwalb-secures-21-million-purdue)
[15](https://legislativeanalysis.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Opioid-Litigation-Proceeds-Summary-of-State-Laws.pdf)
[16](https://attorneygenerallynnfitch.com/opioidsettlement/)
[17](https://ncdoj.gov/55-attorneys-general-sign-on-to-7-4-billion-purdue-settlement/)
[18](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/opioid-firms-kept-donating-state-ags-while-negotiating-settlements-n1050671)
[19](https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/attorney-general-ken-paxton-and-multistate-coalition-reach-74-billion-settlement-purdue-pharma-its)
[20](https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/news/story/attorney-general-raoul-secures-720-million-from-eight-opioid-manufacturers)

 

 

 

tobacco lawsuit/settlement and the states took the risk of cost of carrying the overhead of the lawsuit, so that they took the case to federal court – where everyone (judge, state AGs, etc) on the “prosecutor’s” side of the lawsuit – was basically on the payroll… the only extra money that may have to be spent is for some ancillary para-legals. So there was really no “trial”, just mediation, so it was sort of a bench trial? So this legal proceeding was basically “behind closed doors”?

State attorneys general did adopt elements of the tobacco litigation approach, but with important differences in structure, risk, and legal process. In tobacco cases, many outside law firms were retained on contingency contracts and took substantial financial risk to carry litigation overhead, with states depending on fee arrangements negotiated beforehand. In the opioid litigation, most states relied primarily on their own AGs’ offices and internal legal teams, sometimes supplemented by outside counsel, but the risk and cost were largely handled by state legal infrastructure—rather than private firms.[1][2]

Most opioid proceedings were centralized in federal court (MDL 2804, Northern District of Ohio) under Judge Dan Polster, who organized the process around settlement negotiations rather than extended jury trials. These negotiations were generally conducted through mediation and “negotiation classes,” often without the public or traditional trial proceedings, meaning much of the key decision-making was effectively “behind closed doors” among judge, AGs, defense, and mediators. The result was less a bench trial and more a series of court-facilitated mediations and settlements, with federal oversight, documentation requirements, and some limited open proceedings, but very few actual contested trials.[3][4][5]

Unlike jury trials, these legal actions did not feature public evidentiary hearings or cross-examination; instead, settlements were brokered through judicial mediation efforts, negotiations, and sometimes approval by a federal judge, reflecting a process that was not very transparent to the public, with key decisions occurring in judicial chambers and closed mediation sessions. Thus, while the structure echoes parts of the tobacco template, opioid litigation by state AGs was a more internally managed, mediation-oriented process that often lacked the open adversarial features of conventional trials.[6][4][3]

[1](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5871135/)
[2](https://www.classaction.com/news/opioid-lawsuits-big-tobacco/)
[3](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB10365/LSB10365.2.pdf)
[4](https://law.stanford.edu/2019/10/01/opioid-negotiation-class-may-be-organic-procedure-evolution/)
[5](https://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/mdl-2804)
[6](https://www.npr.org/2021/09/01/1031053251/sackler-family-immunity-purdue-pharma-oxcyontin-opioid-epidemic)
[7](https://nashp.org/understanding-opioid-settlement-spending-plans-across-states-key-components-and-approaches/)
[8](https://legislativeanalysis.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Opioid-Litigation-Proceeds-Summary-of-State-Laws.pdf)
[9](https://www.naccho.org/uploads/downloadable-resources/OpioidSettlementsPDFFinal.pdf)
[10](https://nationalopioidsettlement.com/executive-summary/)
[11](https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/working-for-tennessee/filings-of-interest/opioids.html)
[12](https://www.naag.org/issues/opioids/)
[13](https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/2021-07-21-Final-Distributor-Settlement-Agreement.pdf)
[14](https://goultralaw.com/tools/opioid-settlement-calculator-for-individuals/)
[15](https://lawecommons.luc.edu/context/luclj/article/2776/viewcontent/4_Art_Aaron__11_87_.pdf)
[16](http://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Engstrom-Rabin-73-Stan.-L.-Rev.-285-1.pdf)
[17](https://legislativeanalysis.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Opioid-Litigation-Proceeds-Summary-of-State-Laws.pdf)
[18](https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/news/2018/3/21/pr18-09.html)
[19](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0955395923000464)
[20](https://attorneygenerallynnfitch.com/opioidsettlement/)

 

being paid out, when these wholesalers did not have any first hand information on who prescribed these controlled meds, no first hand medical/healthcare information on the pts who were prescribed these medications. Did anyone involved in these negotiations have any medical education/backgrounds or review of the medical records on these same pts that would end up with less controlled meds that they had been receiving previously for years or decades.

The final opioid settlement agreements with the three major drug wholesalers—AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health, and McKesson—did result in new distribution controls for controlled medications, which have led to reports of patient access limitations, including for people with longstanding, medically justified needs for these drugs. Many chronic pain patients, some of whom are disabled, have expressed that these restrictions are causing hardship and could be seen as discriminatory. There is an ongoing legal and ethical debate about whether such blanket policies run afoul of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities, including those treated for conditions requiring opioids. However, courts have generally found it difficult to prove that these policies exclusively or disproportionately deny access to people with disabilities—official rulings so far have not held the wholesalers’ new policies to be ADA violations.[1][2][3][4][5]

Regarding the use of medical expertise in mediation negotiations, available documentation indicates that negotiations relied heavily on public health officials, attorneys general, government lawyers, and some outside counsel, but did not feature systematic review of the medical records of individual patients affected by reduced opioid access. Instead, settlements and compliance policy changes were focused on population-level distribution data, reporting, and aggregate public health harms rather than individual review or medical necessity determinations. There is no evidence that prescribers’ clinical records or individual disability claims were substantively reviewed during the final settlement processes.[6][7][5]

For shareholders, the settlements did have substantial financial impacts on the companies as billions in payouts reduced available profits, created legal risk, and depressed stock prices at times, even though the companies themselves did not handle prescribing decisions or have patient medical records access. The legal theory of liability was based on distribution and reporting failures rather than individual patient harm or prescriber intent.[8][5][9]

In summary:
– Many disabled patients are experiencing reduced access, but legal obstacles remain in proving ADA violations by distributors.[2][3][4]
– No systematic review of affected disabled patients’ medical records occurred in settlement mediation.[7][6]
– Financial harm to shareholders has been significant, despite distribution companies not prescribing or directly managing patients.[9][8]

[1](https://www.healthlawadvisor.com/doj-considers-opioid-use-disorder-an-ada-covered-disability-and-pursues-claims-against-a-provider-for-refusing-medical-services-to-opioid-users)
[2](https://www.pharmacytimes.com/view/patient-alleges-chain-s-opioid-policy-violates-antidiscrimination-statutes)
[3](https://www.ada.gov/resources/opioid-use-disorder/)
[4](https://adata.org/factsheet/ada-addiction-and-recovery-private-businesses)
[5](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/21/health/opioids-distributors-settlement.html)
[6](https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/insights/mdls-to-watch-national-prescription-opioid-litigation/)
[7](https://www.propublica.org/article/pharmaceuticals-pay-doctors-drugs)
[8](https://www.morningstar.com/sustainable-investing/what-investors-should-know-about-26-billion-opioid-settlement)
[9](https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=61311)
[10](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-secures-settlement-resolve-disability-discrimination-against-people-opioid)
[11](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7859880/)
[12](https://www.lac.org/news/doj-settlement-with-skilled-nursing-facility-excluding-people-on-addiction-medication-violates-the-ada)
[13](https://www.kaplangrady.com/first-court-ruling-clarifying-that-title-ii-of-the-ada-protects-individuals-engaging-in-illegal-drug-use/)
[14](https://goultralaw.com/tools/opioid-settlement-calculator-for-individuals/)
[15](https://www.bmj.com/content/368/bmj.m409)
[16](https://www.opioidsettlementtracker.com/globalsettlementtracker)
[17](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6140023/)
[18](https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/us-attorneys-office-settles-disability-discrimination-complaint-skilled-nursing-facility)
[19](https://jm-aq.com/opioid-litigation-settlements-remediating-the-harms-caused-by-the-opioid-crisis/)
[20](https://www.afslaw.com/perspectives/alerts/opioid-use-and-the-ada-eeoc-issues-new-guidance)

Filed under: General Problems