An example of our judicial/legal system AT IT’S BEST?
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1523720324855914498.html
More from @jesusrodriguezb
Jan 31
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https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1523720324855914498.html
Jan 31
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After reading this, I did a “word search” for “strength” & “potency” and came up with ZERO MATCHES. The word “quality” shows up 18 times and here is a recent post on my blog How Reliable Are Your Generic Drugs From India?
Are they using the word “quality” to encompass strength or potency or give the illusion that the potency and/or strength from the testing are within FDA standards ? Am I the only one that is concerned that the FDA such quality control violations that the FDA shut down a pharma production plant …But it made an exception for 25 medications, including the cancer drugs, because of shortages. If you are dealing with cancer, and your only choice of a med provided by a pharma whose plant has been shut down because of quality control issues in the plant. Would you be concerned that if the cancer does “do you in” .. the medication might ?
U.S. military officials are so concerned about the quality of generic drugs that the Department of Defense is devising a program to test the safety of widely used medicines.
Defense officials are in talks with Valisure, an independent lab, to test the quality and safety of generic drugs it purchases for millions of military members and their families, according to several people familiar with the matter who asked not to be named as the details aren’t public.
The move raises questions about the Food and Drug Administration’s ability to adequately police generic medicines. With mounting drug shortages, most of which are caused by quality problems, military officials have gone so far as to call vulnerabilities in the drug supply chain a national security threat.
Aware of growing quality problems, the White House has convened a task force that’s exploring whether testing could be expanded more broadly in the US. If the Pentagon pilot is successful, it could serve as a model for Medicare or the Department of Veterans Affairs, people familiar with the matter said. But there are tensions in Washington: In conversations with the White House, the FDA has pushed back against additional quality checks, questioning the accuracy of third-party labs like Valisure.
The agency said it stands behind medicines sold in the US and Americans can be confident about their quality.
Drugmakers are required to test their drugs for impurities. The industry doesn’t share results with the FDA, rather companies keep files that agency inspectors comb through when they visit drug production plants once every year or two. Over the last decade, FDA inspectors have found many manipulated test results. The agency can ask a plant to shut down if it finds major problems. This can lead to or exacerbate drug shortages, which is an acute problem in the US right now.
The FDA said in 2019 that 62% of drug shortages were caused by quality issues. Sometimes even the threat of a shortage can force the US to accept drugs from low-quality suppliers that, under other conditions, would have been cut off. Drug shortages are currently at a five-year high in the US and climbing.
The idea for the Pentagon’s drug testing program was motivated by weaknesses in the pharmaceutical supply chain exposed by the Covid crisis. A recent Congressional mandate also required military officials to further investigate the threat of America’s increasing reliance on overseas manufacturers.
“They’re taking that risk very seriously,” said Valisure Chief Executive Officer David Light, who declined to comment specifically on the department’s plans to partner with his company.
The Defense Department didn’t comment on a detailed list of questions sent by Bloomberg News.
The Pentagon’s proposed program follows a similar one quietly launched by Kaiser Permanente, details of which have never been reported. Kaiser, which serves 12.7 million Americans, started working with Valisure on additional drug quality checks more than two years ago, said Sean Buhler, Kaiser’s vice president of pharmacy strategic sourcing and procurement.
If Valisure detects quality issues, Kaiser turns to other manufacturers. That data also provides an early warning system for shortages: If a drug’s quality is so bad that it could trigger a recall, the health system starts preparing.
Kaiser has pursued the testing program with Valisure as “an additional assurance for our members’ safety and care beyond the current testing that the FDA is mandating,” Buhler said.
Through its testing for Kaiser, Valisure flagged that the ingredients from one supplier contained higher levels of lead when compared with another option — though both suppliers’ lead levels fell within the FDA’s standards. This finding allowed Kaiser to avoid the drug with more lead.
University of Kentucky started a program in 2019 to test drugs purchased through the college’s network of hospitals and clinics. More than 10% of drugs have been flagged with potential problems, said Robert Lodder, a pharmaceutical sciences professor who co-leads the testing effort.
These programs aim to unearth issues that are invisible to the average person. Patients may not know if they’re repeatedly taking small amounts of a chemical that can cause cancer, as has been the case with some heart and diabetes drugs.
Valisure is known for finding dangerous chemicals in drugs and personal-care products. It hopes to become the go-to source for ingredient verification for many products on store shelves.
The FDA has repeatedly pushed back against testing programs including Valisure’s, saying third-party labs don’t use the same protocols as drug manufacturers. The agency has also warned unnecessary testing and inaccurate results could exacerbate drug shortages. The FDA does a limited amount of drug testing itself.
“Protecting patients is the highest priority of the FDA,” Jeremy Kahn, an agency spokesman, said in an email. “The FDA continues to work to build a safe, secure and agile drug supply chain so that American patients have the medications they need – medications that have been carefully reviewed by the FDA for safety, effectiveness and quality.”
In response to the FDA’s suggestion that third-party labs don’t follow the same protocols as drug companies, Valisure’s Light said the company’s tests are faster and less expensive and still accurately spot problems.
FDA inspection documents, mainly from visits to factories in India over the past year and a half, have outlined a rash of violations. Some of the more alarming findings concern Accord Healthcare, a subsidiary of India-based Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
Intas makes more than 100 generic drugs approved in the US, including copycats of the cholesterol-lowering pill Lipitor and erectile-dysfunction drug Cialis, according to an FDA database.
Last November, agency inspectors visited an Intas facility in Ahmedabad, India. Workers appeared to have recently destroyed sensitive quality-control documents, according to an account of the visit written by FDA inspectors. After shredding documents before inspectors arrived, Intas workers stuffed remnants into trash bags and tossed them into a truck, throwing acid on a bag that hadn’t made it onto the truck.
Following the inspection, Intas shut down operations at the plant. The FDA required extra testing on some cancer drugs — a slow but necessary process that resulted in shortages of critical chemotherapies like cisplatin, methotrexate and carboplatin. Last week, the FDA banned the Intas factory from sending drugs to the US. But it made an exception for 25 medications, including the cancer drugs, because of shortages. Intas didn’t respond to a request for comment.
The FDA is similarly allowing Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. to send another widely used cancer drug to the US despite it being made in a factory in India that was so rife with safety violations it was banned in December from selling an undisclosed number of other treatments in the US.
Both Sun and Intas are required to get extra quality tests on the drugs they’re sending to the US from banned factories.
A Sun spokesperson said the company is “taking all necessary steps to resolve the outstanding issues as fast as possible.”
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https://www.medpagetoday.com/meetingcoverage/ama/104948
CHICAGO — The criminalization of medicine is taking its toll on physicians — and not just those who perform abortions, members of the American Medical Association (AMA) House of Delegates said here Saturday during the AMA annual meeting.
“A doctor who can’t get in trouble for malpractice because no patient has been harmed can end up in federal prison for 20-plus years because they prescribed off-guidelines,” said Stuart Gitlow, MD, MPH, MBA, of New York City, a delegate for the American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM). “This is unacceptable. It’s been unacceptable for more than 2 decades now. And it’s time for us to push back.”
Gitlow was speaking at an AMA reference committee meeting in favor of a resolution introduced by ASAM that called for the AMA to “study the rapidly changing environment in which the practice of medicine has been criminalized” and how that is affecting medical practice. The resolution also sought a report back to the delegates by the AMA June 2024 annual meeting. ASAM’s resolution was discussed in conjunction with a similar resolution from the New York delegation.
Gitlow noted that the Controlled Substances Act “requires that physicians who prescribe controlled substances do so by issuing the prescription for a legitimate medical purpose,” but the Justice Department sees it differently from physicians. The department “has said on multiple indictments, that if somebody departs from guidelines, such as by prescribing a medication off-label, for instance, that they are then not acting in the usual course of professional practice, and therefore, they are subject to indictment,” he said. “As a result, we have past presidents of three different state addiction societies, and multiple pain medicine societies, who are either under indictment, have been raided, or are in prison.”
Monalisa Tailor, MD, of Louisville, Kentucky, speaking for the Kentucky delegation in support of the resolution, said that when gender-affirming care came up for discussion in the Kentucky legislature this year, “there were many terrible things said about the practice of medicine and physicians in my state. This is also applied to our abortion providers and our ob/gyns … We’re going to continue to see state legislatures propose these types of laws that suggest that the practice of medicine should be criminalized — for us just taking care of our patients.”
Criminalization also increases the likelihood of violence towards physicians “because it gives people the idea that we are doing something wrong,” said Sean Figy, MD, of Omaha, Nebraska, who spoke on behalf of the Young Physicians Section and the Plastic Surgery Caucus. “And therefore, for some reason, it makes people think they can threaten us and threaten death for our families … So I do think it’s really important to help us figure out how we can make it better.”
Delegates also discussed a report by the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) on ethical principles for physicians involved in practices owned by private equity firms. The report recommended that physicians who contract with these companies make sure that the contract “minimizes conflict of interest” in the way doctors are paid and doesn’t encourage undue restrictions on patient care, and that it also “does not compromise physicians’ own financial well-being or ability to provide high-quality care.”
In addition, the contract should “allow the physician to appropriately exercise professional judgment” and “enable physicians to participate in, if not outright control, decisions about practice staffing,” the report said.
Several people spoke up in favor of the report. “As we know, there is a national trend to more and more practices being taken over by private equity, with the consequent pressure on the physicians to do things not in the best interest of the patients,” said Tim Fagan, MD, alternative delegate from Arizona speaking on behalf of the PacWest delegation. “So the PacWest speaks strongly in support of this report.”
But others complained the report didn’t go far enough. “[The report] did discuss the requirement for physicians to maintain fiduciary responsibility, but does not discuss whether or not it is ethical for a corporation to take large profits out of healthcare,” said former AMA president Barbara McAneny, MD, of Albuquerque, New Mexico, a delegate from the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) who was speaking for herself.
“Private equity companies are composed of wealthy people seeking to increase their wealth; they expect to exit their investment with returns of five to 10 times the investment. And that level of profit is not going to be generated by efficiencies of delivering care or by avoiding unnecessary care,” said McAneny. “That money will come from somewhere — and the only options are that that money comes from patients, physicians, and the taxpayers who support governmental programs.” She urged the committee to “send this report back to CEJA and ask them to give us guidance on one of the more pressing issues of our time, which is whether or not private equity should be playing any role in profiteering in healthcare.”
“This is a pretty toothless report,” said Brett Coldiron, MD, an Ohio delegate from Cincinnati who spoke for the Great Lakes delegation in favor of sending the report back to CEJA. “Private equity has devastated dermatology and anesthesiology, and it’s coming your way.” When private equity-owned practices go broke, “they seize their accounts receivable and [the doctors] still have a non-compete,” he added. “So it’s a terrible situation and we need a better recommendation to work with.”
The committee will consider the delegates’ comments and then issue a report with its own recommendations, which the entire House of Delegates will vote on during its general session starting on Monday.
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ECONOMY OF SCALE: The Wall Street Journal reports that “the combined company will have significantly heightened bargaining power in negotiating with hospitals and doctors,” a factor the companies hope “will boost profits and possibly even drive down medical costs to patients.”
And it follows that “hospitals and doctors will be willing to offer more enticing price concessions in order to treat more patients.“
It was announced on our local news a few nights ago that Humana was canceling Humana gives up 1,600 downtown Louisville parking spaces
I wouldn’t put any money on doctors treating more pts, it is more likely that the mid-level practitioners to physician ratios will increase. I have read that reimbursement for services provided by mid-levels reimbursed by insurance companies is 85% of what would be paid if a physician provided the same service. Typically, mid-levels pay scale is not up to 85% of that of a physician.
United HealthCare Corp., the Minnesota-based managed care giant, yesterday announced that it is merging with “rival” Humana Inc. of Kentucky in a $6 billion deal that will create “one of the nation’s most powerful players in the managed care industry.” The AP/Minneapolis Star Tribune reports that the two companies are among the nation’s “ten largest health care corporations.” United’s headquarters will stay in Minnetonka, MN, and William McGuire, will keep his CEO and chair titles. The AP/Star Tribune reports that the merged entity will “the nation’s largest publicly held health plan company” (Howatt/Feyder, 5/29). The long-term effects of Humana’s sale to United will not be felt in Kentucky for “four to seven months,” said Humana spokesperson Tom Noland. The Lexington Herald-Leader reports that “[w]hile United HealthCare has pledged to keep ‘a significant work force’ in Louisville, job cuts are likely.” Humana is Kentucky’s sixth-largest corporate employer and has played a key role in the state’s health care reforms, the Herald-Leader reports. Humana CEO Greg Wolfe told Kentucky’s insurance commissioner that his company would participate in the state’s individual market beginning this summer (Fernandez/Sharp/Butters, 5/29).
10 Million Strong
The Wall Street Journal reports that “the combined company will have significantly heightened bargaining power in negotiating with hospitals and doctors,” a factor the companies hope “will boost profits and possibly even drive down medical costs to patients.” The new company will cover 10.4 million people nationwide, bringing in annual revenues of $27 billion, according to the Journal. “If you have a million members instead of 500,000, people will listen to you a lot more attentively,” said Kenneth Abramowitz, an analyst with Sanford Bernstein & Co. And it follows that “hospitals and doctors will be willing to offer more enticing price concessions in order to treat more patients.” The Journal reports that “United is hoping to achieve cost savings of 3% to 5% of its $4.8 billion in annual operating expenses, or nearly $200 million,” and to save another $200 million in total medical care costs through renegotiated contracts, according to United officials. The Journal notes that the companies make a good couple because they are both “regarded as industry leaders in efforts to promote quality-of-care among the doctors who participate in their health care plans” (Burton/Lipin, 5/29).
Terms Of Engagement
Under yesterday’s agreement, the New York Times reports that United will “exchange one of its shares for two shares of Humana and assume $850 million of Humana’s debt.” On the New York Stock Exchange yesterday, United shares fell $1.625 to $62.50 and Humana’s rose $3.625 to $29.875. The Times reports that based on United shares’ Wednesday closing price of $64.125, the “stock swap” is valued at $5.5 billion (Freudenheim, 5/29).
From The Mountains, To The Oceans
Humana will strengthen United’s “presence in several key states, especially Illinois, Wisconsin, Texas, Florida and Ohio,” according to the Star Tribune (5/29). The Chicago Tribune reports that the deal will “change the competitive health care landscape in Illinois,” as United is currently the state’s second largest HMO and Humana is the third largest. “The combination will knock Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois … out of first place,” and in a first, the state’s “HMO markets will be dominated by a publicly traded, for-profit company based elsewhere,” the Tribune reports (Buck/Graham, 5/29). The Dallas Morning News reports that the two companies serve over 1.5 million Texas members and that the “merger caps a hectic year of repositioning among the ten largest [HMOs] serving North Texas” (Ornstein, 5/29). In Ohio, the merger “will result in Greater Cincinnati’s largest HMO changing hands twice in less than a year,” the Cincinnati Enquirer reports. The deal “will affect about 380,000 Tristate residents covered by United, Humana or ChoiceCare — the once-independent HMO that Humana acquired last year” (Bonfield, 5/29). The merger will affect 1.4 million Humana members in Florida and about 900,000 of United’s in the Sunshine State. Gary Frazier of Bear Stearns & Co. said the deal would create the nation’s third largest health plan in terms of enrollment, second only to Kaiser Permanente and Blue Cross and Blue Shield
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Once again a BENCH TRIAL, don’t know if Walgreens asked for a trial by jury and it was denied by the judge who mandated a BENCH TRIAL. So that the judge is judge and jury. This whole agreement is both interesting and a contradiction. Walgreens “agreed” to pay $500 million – while admitting no wrongdoing – for claims that Walgreens failed to stop ILLEGAL PILL SALES. Mark Pifko, attorney for the state, seems to conflate pharma Rx opioids and illegal street opioids and likewise, what is the real reason for the estimated 500,000 drug overdose deaths?
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/drugs-chamber/2023/06/09/id/1123052/
Walgreens Boots Alliance has agreed to pay $500 million to New Mexico to settle claims that its pharmacies helped fuel opioid addiction in the state by failing to stop illegal pill sales, lawyers for the state announced Friday.
The settlement, the largest obtained by New Mexico against a single company over opioids, came after a non-jury trial last year in the state’s lawsuit against the company. The judge overseeing that trial had not yet ruled on the state’s claims.
“We are confident that this record settlement positions New Mexico to turn the tide on this deadly epidemic,” Mark Pifko, a lawyer for the state, said in a statement.
Walgreens did not admit wrongdoing under the settlement. A spokesperson for the company declined to comment.
More than half a million people died from drug overdoses in the United States from 1999 to 2020, with opioids playing an outsized role. Overdose deaths have risen further since then, according to data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
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The 3 largest drug wholesalers – all of whom are publicly traded companies – got to pay a fine to settle similar violations and continue in business but apparently, this 180-year-old family-owned business was shut down by the DEA because it was unique in its willingness to challenge those accusations in the DEA’s administrative court.
The question that has to be asked, is what is going to happen to the controlled meds that had been allocated to this wholesaler? Will the estimated 600-800 million dollars of controls allocated to this wholesaler, just “disappear ” and be a reduction in the various pharma production quotas?
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration stripped one of the nation’s largest drug distributors of its license to sell highly addictive painkillers Friday after determining it failed to flag thousands of suspicious orders at the height of the opioid crisis.
The action against Morris & Dickson Co. that threatens to put it out of business came two days after an Associated Press investigation found the DEA allowed the company to keep shipping drugs for nearly four years after a judge recommended the harshest penalty for its “cavalier disregard” of rules aimed at preventing opioid abuse.
The DEA acknowledged the time it took to issue its final decision was “longer than typical for the agency” but blamed Morris & Dickson in part for holding up the process by seeking delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic and its lengthy pursuit of a settlement that the agency said it had considered. The order becomes effective in 90 days, allowing more time to negotiate a settlement.
DEA Administrator Anne Milgram said in the 68-page order that Morris & Dickson failed to accept full responsibility for its past actions, which included shipping 12,000 unusually large orders of opioids to pharmacies and hospitals between 2014 and 2018. During this time, the company filed just three suspicious order reports with the DEA.
Milgram specifically cited testimony of then-president Paul Dickson Sr. in 2019 that the company’s compliance program was “dang good” and he didn’t think a “single person has gotten hurt by (their) drugs.”
“Those statements from the president of a family-owned and operated company so strongly miss the point of the requirements of a DEA registrant,” she wrote. “Its acceptance of responsibility did not prove that it or its principals understand the full extent of their wrongdoing … and the potential harm it caused.”
Shreveport, Louisiana-based Morris & Dickson traces its roots to 1840, when its namesake founder arrived from Wales and placed an ad in a local newspaper selling medicines. It has since become the nation’s fourth-largest wholesale drug distributor, with $4 billion a year in revenue and nearly 600 employees serving pharmacies and hospitals in 29 states.
In a statement, the company said it has invested millions of dollars over the past few years to revamp its compliance systems and appeared to hold out hope for a settlement.
“Morris & Dickson is grateful to the DEA administrator for delaying the effective date of the order to allow time to settle these old issues,” it said. “We remain confident we can achieve an outcome that safeguards the supply chain for all of our healthcare partners and the communities they serve. … Business will continue as usual and orders will continue to go out on time.”
Morris & Dickson’s much larger competitors, a trio of pharmaceutical distributors known as the Big Three, have already agreed to pay the federal government more than $1 billion in fines and penalties to settle similar violations. Cardinal Health, AmerisourceBergen and McKesson also agreed to pay $21 billion over 18 years to resolve claims as part of a nationwide settlement.
While Morris & Dickson wasn’t the only drug distributor who the DEA accused of fueling the opioid crisis, it was unique in its willingness to challenge those accusations in the DEA’s administrative court.
In a scathing recommendation in 2019, Administrative Law Judge Charles W. Dorman said Morris & Dickson’s argument that it has changed its ways was too little, too late.
Anything less than the most severe punishment, the judge said, “would communicate to DEA registrants that despite their transgressions, no matter how egregious, they will get a mere slap on the wrist and a second chance so long as they acknowledge their sins and vow to sin no more.”
But as the ensuing years passed, neither the Biden-nominated Milgram nor her two predecessors took any enforcement action. Past DEA officials told the AP such decisions usually take no more than two years.
As the pills kept flowing, Morris & Dickson attempted to stave off punishment, appealing directly to Milgram to order a reopening of the proceedings, arguing it would introduce new evidence showing it had implemented an “ideal” compliance program with the help of a consultant who is now second-in-command at the DEA, Louis Milione. The DEA said that Milione has recused himself from all agency business related to Morris & Dickson.
Milione retired from the DEA in 2017 after a 21-year career that included two years leading the division that controls the sale of highly addictive narcotics. Like dozens of colleagues in the DEA’s powerful-but-little-known Office of Diversion Control, he went to work as a consultant for some of the same companies he had been tasked with regulating.
Milione was hired by Morris & Dickson in 2018 as part of a $3 million contract and later testified that the company “spared no expense” to overhaul its compliance systems, cancel suspicious orders and send daily emails to the DEA spelling out its actions.
A footnote of the DEA’s order Friday said that since Milione returned to the DEA as principal deputy administrator in 2021, he has not had any contact with Milgram or other agency staff about the Morris & Dickson case due to his prior involvement with the company.
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By the time you read this, hopefully, I will have my NEW PARTIAL LEFT KNEE. Unlike too many people, I did not wait until all three points that the knee rests on deteriorated to bone on bone and I only had one of three of those points is bone on bone.
They tell me that the surgeon is going to resurface/reshape that one point and insert what looks like a piece of plastic that is supposed to have a life expectancy of 30 yrs..
The procedure is supposed to be dramatically less barbaric than a total knee replacement, with less pain, a shorter recoup period of 3-4 months as opposed to 6 to 12 months with a total knee.
I don’t have to have a 3-day stay in a hospital stay nor a week+ stay in a PT REHAB.
Going to have PT at home for a couple of weeks and then go to out pt rehab, which is about 2 miles from our home.
Not sure how many days I will be on the “sidelines”
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What could go wrong with taking Andrew Kolodny’s advice on the fabricated opioid crisis? Just look at the J&J trial in OK, with J&J being charged with being a public nuisance, because they were the raw opioid powder wholesaler to the rest of the pharma industry that made FDA-approved opioid medications. Reported, Kolondy was hired as the Federal expert and was paid some $500,000 – $600,000 for his involvement in the trial. Initially, J&J was found guilty but was later overturned. Apparently, in the end, the only ones that came out ahead financially from the trial were J&J attorneys and Andrew Kolodny.
In response to Tranq – a horrifying “new” drug sweeping the nation – Kolodny, America’s “drug expert,” proposes a solution. And gets it all wrong.
Some people just can’t admit when they’re wrong.
A number of times in the past I have questioned whether Andrew Kolodny, a psychiatrist and the president of the execrable Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing (PROP), is qualified to be the media’s go-to expert whenever drugs – especially opioids – are in a news article where a quote is needed.
When MedPage Today needed a quote about xylazine (aka Tranq, not an opioid), the horrific drug that I wrote about last October, unsurprisingly they went to Kolodny. [Emphasis mine]
Andrew Kolodny, MD, an expert in opioid policy and addiction medicine at Brandeis University in Massachusetts, said xylazine is probably widely diverted because it’s unscheduled.
“If it were scheduled, distributors would have to have a suspicious order monitoring system. It’s a DEA [requirement] that would tell you, for example, your Philadelphia region, or a particular veterinary practice you’re distributing to, are outliers and you can’t continue to fill that order. You have to report them,” he explained.
“For sure, you would not see xylazine all over the place if it was scheduled,” Kolodny added.
Kristina Fiore in MedPage Today, “Will Xylazine Become a Controlled Substance?“
These are mind-boggling responses, but they are consistent with Kolodny’s stubbornly false narrative on opioids – that today’s surge in opioid overdose deaths is a result of the overprescription of painkilling drugs. Going a step further, PROP members believe that a further reduction will save lives, a statement that is not only preposterous but also demonstrably false, something that is made clear in Aubry and Carr’s 2022 article in Frontiers in Pain Research.
Based on the results presented in this paper and the current trends in opioid deaths, the policies of cutting [prescription opioid sales] to prevent deaths and hospital admissions… are unfounded and ineffective.”
Aubry and Carr, Front. Pain Res., 04 August 2022
Sec. Pain Research Methods, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpain.2022.884674
Suffice it to say that any knowledgeable, rational person would know by now that the strict restrictions placed on legal (and safer) (1) drugs have resulted in a supply of illegal and far more dangerous drugs taking their place. This is not only not surprising but also predictable.
Dr. Jeffrey Singer, a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, a practicing surgeon, and ACSH advisor has written about the “Iron Law of Prohibition,” a term coined in the late 20th century: “As law enforcement becomes more intense, the potency of prohibited substances increases.”
Singer recently wrote in The Iron Law of Prohibition: Introducing “Tranq”:
The iron law of prohibition cannot be repealed. Drug cartels will keep generating new and more potent drugs, alone or in combination with existing ones, as long as policymakers refuse to end drug prohibition.
What is scheduling?
According to the DEA, the agency in charge of classifying drugs:
Drugs, substances, and certain chemicals used to make drugs are classified into five (5) distinct categories or schedules depending upon the drug’s acceptable medical use and the drug’s abuse or dependency potential.
Since xylazine is a veterinary product that is relatively new on the human scene it is not a scheduled drug, meaning it can be bought or sold legally requiring only a veterinarian’s prescription. Kolodny proposes that scheduling xylazine would solve the emerging problem:
“For sure, you would not see xylazine all over the place if it was scheduled”
In what universe might this be true? Staying in ours, for now, it is trivial to demonstrate that his solution is nonsensical. There are plenty of historical data to prove this.
Scheduling does not reduce drug overdose deaths
1. Fentanyl
Pharmaceutical fentanyl, an essential medication, is a Schedule II drug – the most restrictive legal class of drugs. Yet that did not stop the US from being flooded with the illegal variety, which has been responsible for the majority of drug overdose deaths since the mid-2010s.
Fentanyl overdose deaths by year, 1999-2020. Source: Statista
2, 3. Cocaine and methamphetamine
Both cocaine and methamphetamine have legitimate (but limited) medical uses in humans and are also Schedule II. But this hasn’t stopped the importation of many tons of illegal versions of both drugs, as demonstrated by the growing numbers of deaths:
Source: NIDA
4. Heroin
Heroin is a Schedule I drug (no legal use) and the pattern of increasing deaths over the past decade is similar, but with a wrinkle…
Source: NIDA
As was the case with illicit fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphentamine, there was also a spike in heroin deaths beginning in 2010, largely driven by the reformulation of OxyContin. But in this case, there is a drop-off beginning around 2017 when fentanyl began to take its market share, a trend that continues at the current time.
5. Prescription opioids
Source: NIDA
The death rate from prescription opioids did not soar like the four drugs above; the number of overdose deaths has remained constant over the last decade (red hatched line). Why? These drugs are safer and more difficult to come by than whatever is on the street. It is not a coincidence that we are seeing the most deaths from the most dangerous drugs or that the most dangerous drugs have been more widely-used since the crackdown on prescription painkillers began. The Iron Law is alive and well.
During the time when opioid prescriptions were cut by 60%, overdose deaths from illegal fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine all surged. What is really going on? I can come up with only one rational explanation: In the past decade the misuse of illegal drugs of all kinds, not legal prescription pills, has increased and this is what is responsible for our ever-growing annual death toll. Scheduled or not, the deadliest drugs have been doing the killing.
Summary
Back to Tranq
Let’s take one more look at Kolodny’s “solution” and appreciate how ridiculous it really is.
“For sure, you would not see xylazine all over the place if it was scheduled”
Does anyone really believe that this is correct? I sure don’t.
But I do believe this:
We are now fighting a losing battle against heroin, fentanyl, and Tranq. Something worse will be next. Why not admit “defeat” and loosen up on oxycodone? Anyone with a working brain will be able to predict the result. Overdoses and death will drop and probably by a lot.
NOTES:
(1) Prescription opioids are far safer than drugs that can be bought on the street, both because the drug’s identity and dose are known in legally prescribed medicines but not in counterfeit versions.
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This is an interesting read, outlining how all the states spent the BILLIONS they got from the 1998 Tobacco Settle. This hyperlink in particular hyperlink https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/what-we-do/us/statereport shows that collectively the 50 states spent < 3% of what they agreed upon on tobacco smoking cessation programs. The tobacco money was a 25 yr payout, maybe that suggests why they started getting pretty aggressive against the Rx opioid distribution channel over the last few years. Have they gotten “financially addicted” to that tobacco money, because it would appear that most just put it in their general fund and spent it where there was a need for something else than what they promised to use it on? Does it also seem sort of strange that they only sued the Tobacco manufacturers, but with the FDA-approved Rx opioid products they have sued the manufacturers, wholesalers, and major retail distributors? I guess they estimated that there was not enough by just suing the manufacturers to make up for the tobacco money that is going to dry up.
https://www.opioidsettlementtracker.com/settlementspending/#map
This page documents states’ plans for their opioid settlement winnings.
For the birds-eye view of opioid settlements reached thus far, visit the Global Settlement Tracker (quick jump: States’ Opioid Settlement Statuses).
This spreadsheet links to every state’s opioid settlement spending plan, be it a state-subdivision agreement, statutory trust, or allocation statute. Given that it tracks pending legislation as well, it may fairly be considered the superset of the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee’s NationalOpioidSettlement.com.
A collection of my mini-lectures about the opioid settlement spending landscape.
*These FAQs are excerpted from my greater Opioid Settlement FAQs tab.
KHN senior correspondent Aneri Pattani is writing articles about the use of opioid settlement funds and is eager to hear from people across the country. Reach out to her through her tip form. (She has promised to keep your information confidential unless you give explicit permission otherwise.)
“In advance of the money, more than 40 states have passed laws or formed frameworks governing how the money is distributed and used, while several have bills in progress, said Christine Minhee, the founder of a watchdog website, Opioid Settlement Tracker.”
Below is a 50-state survey of publicly reported opioid settlement spending plans, i.e., states’ state-subdivision agreements (e.g., North Carolina’s MOA), allocation statutes (e.g., Indiana’s HB 1193), and statutory trusts (Massachusetts’ Opioid Recovery and Remediation Trust Fund).
It captures “the basics,” so to speak: the plans themselves, state-local allocation ratios, fund allocations (if any), and citations relating to control. But it does not dive into each state’s self-imposed expenditure reporting requirements, the valence of advisory board recommendations, the willingness to prioritize evidence-based interventions over the politically comfortable tried-and-true… or other important nuances that speak to character.
Last updated May 21, 2023 (see, e.g., Ohio, Tennessee, and Indiana). States with an asterisk (*) are those without plans acknowledged by the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee. If you see something I’ve missed, email Tips@OpioidSettlementTracker.com.
Colorado — Department of Law’s Opioid Abatement Innovation Challenge Request for Application (due 6/30)
Hawaii — Department of Health, Alcohol and Drug Abuse Division’s Opioid Settlement Program Specialist opening (“[r]ecruitment on a continuous basis until needs are met”)
Kansas — Kansas Fights Addiction (KFA) Grant Review Board’s Request for Proposals (due 6/23; see 5/2 AG press)
New York — OASAS’ Connections to Care Request for Application (due 5/22)
Tennessee — University of Tennessee Institute for Public Service SMART Initiative’s job openings (Jackson, Knoxville, Nashville) (due 5/15)
Local opportunities are tracked below.
“States’ Opioid Settlement Allocation Plans” by Christine Minhee, OpioidSettlementTracker.com LLC, is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. This license allows you to “remix, adapt, and build upon [the above] non-commercially,” provided that you credit me — “Christine Minhee, J.D., OpioidSettlementTracker.com” — and license whatever you produce using my work under identical terms. All rights reserved.
A collection of my mini-lectures about the opioid settlement spending landscape.
A bit o’ background as to why opioid settlement spending plans are important at all.
(FAQs below are excerpted from my greater Opioid Settlement FAQs tab.)
How the $26 billion “national” or “global” settlement relates to other opioid settlements: Though often described as “national” or “global,” that widely reported $26 billion settlement — which resolves opioid crisis-related lawsuits between both sets of government plaintiffs (46 states’ Attorneys General and their participating localities) and just four opioid litigation defendants (“big three” distributors McKesson, AmerisourceBergen, and Cardinal Health and manufacturer Johnson & Johnson) — is not the whole egg. It’s at best the yolk of all opioid settlements expected by governments involved in opioid litigation nationwide, with the rest coming from resolutions with those other defendants not included in the $26 billion deal (e.g., Purdue, Mallinckrodt, McKinsey, and all of the pharmacies).
How the plans listed above relate to the $26 billion settlement, and why its requirements are important for opioid settlement spending watchdogs to study: Given that it makes up the biggest chunk of all anticipated opioid settlements, states and localities have been paying the heaviest attention to its requirements. The most notable among them — and the most valuable for watchdogs to know! — is that all states are required to spend at least 70% of their slice of that $26 billion pie on future opioid remediation…
Probably not as poorly as they misspent their big tobacco dollars, given that there are clear contractual protections against that outcome. The juiciest among them:
An explanation, with receipts (citations):
This 70% “future opioid remediation” threshold requirement — one that all participating states must meet — is baked into the language of the $26 billion settlement agreements: “Any State-Subdivision Agreement … shall be applied only if it requires: (a) that all amounts be used for Opioid Remediation, except as allowed by Section V.B.2, and (b) that at least seventy percent (70%) of amounts be used solely for future Opioid Remediation.” Section V.B.1. Section V.B.2 reiterates this threshold for allocation statutes, while Section V.E.2 provides that “[i]n the absence of a State-Subdivision Agreement, Allocation Statute, or Statutory Trust that addresses distribution, the Abatement Accounts Fund will be used solely for future Opioid Remediation.”
Combined with the way the agreements define Opioid Remediation, and with a little bit of math, this 70% threshold yields two other requirements incumbent upon all participating states:
A maximum of 15% of funds may be spent on opioid crisis-related reimbursement and administrative expenses. Section V.B.1 states that “[i]n no event may less than eighty-five percent (85%) of the Settling Distributors’ maximum amount of payments … be spent on Opioid Remediation,” which Section I.SS defines to include both future Opioid Remediation expenses (the explicitly prospective programming that’ll explicitly go towards abating future overdose crisis harms) and reimbursement and administrative expenses. Subtracting the 70% restricted to future Opioid Remediation, that leaves 15% for reimbursement and administrative expenses.
Non-Opioid Remediation expenses — i.e. roads, gubernatorial helicopters, and the other stuff of big tobacco spending retrospective-supplied nightmares — are capped at 15%. To state it as simply as I can, and to dip into some normative verbiage here: Only 15% of participating states’ funds may be spent on the bad stuff. And if settlement funds are spent on non-Opioid Remediation expenses, the settlement documents’ only reporting requirements attach (see Section V.B.2), which is to say nothing of the many optionally self-imposed expenditure reporting requirements I’ve seen in states’ plans (Arizona’s toothy reporting requirements come to mind here). Given that I’ve devoted my legal career to warning folks about the use of opioid settlement misspending. I find this provision heartening!
Therefore, the default allocation framework described in those $26 billion settlement documents — one that’d divvy up a state’s anticipated payout by giving 15% to the state, 15% to its subdivisions (cities and counties), and 70% to an “Abatement Accounts Fund” (the control over which might also rest with the state, depending on the state) — is just one way to satisfy that 70% future Opioid Remediation threshold.
But if you must know: Most states have wiggled away from the settlement agreements’ default allocation suggestions (that 15%-15%-70% thing). This is normal and predictable; each state must maximize lives saved within what is feasible within their jurisdictional (political) “set and settings” (however dystopic the Tim Leary reference in this context might be). As long as states meet the abatement-related thresholds described above, they can allocate their funds between the state government, local governments, and statutory trusts (if any) however they’d like… provided that the plan is articulated by one of three formats and adopts the settlement agreements’ greater requirements. From most commonly seen to least:
State-Subdivision Agreement — e.g., North Carolina’s MOA — “An agreement that a Settling State reaches with the Subdivisions in that State regarding the allocation, distribution, and/or use of funds allocated to that State and to its Subdivisions. A State-Subdivision Agreement shall be effective if approved pursuant to the provisions of Exhibit O or if adopted by statute. Preexisting agreements … shall qualify” (Distributor pg. 10).
Statutory Trust — e.g., Massachusetts’ Opioid Recovery and Remediation Trust Fund — “A trust fund established by state law to receive funds allocated to a Settling State’s Abatement Accounts Fund and restrict any expenditures made using funds from such Settling State’s Abatement Accounts Fund to Opioid Remediation” (Distributor pg. 11).
Allocation Statute — e.g., Indiana’s HB 1193 — “A state law that governs allocation, distribution, and/or use of some or all of the Settlement Fund amounts allocated to that State and/or its Subdivisions. In addition to modifying the allocation set forth in Section V.D.2, an Allocation Statute may, without limitation, contain a Statutory Trust, further restrict expenditures of funds, form an advisory committee, establish oversight and reporting requirements, or address other default provisions and other matters related to the funds” (Distributor pg. 1).
Yes. Examples abound. Recently, New York’s Governor Cuomo used his state’s McKinsey settlement winnings to “supplant state aid rather than to supplement” the state’s overdose crisis prevention efforts, prompting state legislators to urge the passage of legislation that’d “ensure an ironclad, incremental lockbox for future settlement funds.” But the most laugh-cry example comes from now-Senator Joe Manchin; back when he was governor of West Virginia in 2007, he tried using his state’s Purdue settlement winnings to buy himself a personal helicopter.
As explained by Judge Polster himself: “The problem is that in a number of States any money that is, that a state attorney general obtains, either by victory in court, litigated judgment, or settlement, goes into the general fund. And the men and women who control what happens in the general fund are the elected state representatives and senators. That’s what they do. And that’s what happened in the tobacco litigation. Over $200 billion, far more than 90 percent of that was used for public purposes totally unrelated to tobacco smoking, lung cancer, whatever. And I believe that’s why we have all these counties and cities that filed separate lawsuits, to make sure that doesn’t happen again. … [Any settlement] has to address the problem of putting money into the state general funds or else it isn’t going to fly.”
As suggested by experts in Opioid Litigation Proceeds: Cautionary Tales From The Tobacco Settlement: “[R]evenue laws vary from state to state as do the specific language in settlement agreements related to the direction of money to general or restricted funds, yet legislation may be an effective measure to ensure funds are used toward responding to the crisis.” This is why we should generally be happy to see so many statutory trusts and allocation statutes boppin’ about in the spreadsheet above.
Additionally, contracts between the state and local governments have emerged as a vibrant, creative, and politically expedient (e.g., legislature-avoiding) way of articulating spending goals. Bloomberg Law correctly notes that settlement agreements between plaintiffs and defendants (i.e., from outside parties) can rarely dictate intrastate political processes. (“Some state attorneys general don’t have the power to allocate funds that belong to the legislature … . While a master settlement is a contract between parties, … it can’t change a state’s power structure.”) However, contractual agreements between intrastate government plaintiffs — e.g., the memoranda of understanding, state-subdivision agreements, intrastate allocation agreements between state and local governments — are effectively agreements to do so beforehand that manage to avoid offending constitutional separation of powers considerations.
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Pres Biden apparently has a “soft place” in his heart – or head – for substance abusers/addicts. Could that help explain why he stopped the building of the wall along our southern border? Of course, per our 8th Amendment, the SCOTUS ruled years ago that the issue of “cruel and unusual punishment” only applies to those in jail or prisons when it comes to poor or withholding medical care. Why should the administration have to “call out” any part of our judicial system to follow our constitution?
https://www.medpagetoday.com/opinion/doing-time/104590
Those of us who work in jails sat up recently as we read this recent news: The Biden administration called on state Medicaid programs to fund opioid treatment programs in jails and prisons. Wow! To understand why that is such a big deal, let me introduce you to the typical jail’s opioid treatment dilemma.
The U.S. currently has a crisis of opioid abuse, fueled mainly by heroin and fentanyl. We used to talk about “heroin addicts,” but it is unusual to find pure heroin on the street anymore. Heroin is usually mixed with fentanyl, meth, ketamine, or any one of a host of other substances. Fentanyl can be used alone or mixed with other substances. Because of this trend, what we used to call heroin addiction is now termed opioid use disorder (OUD). One estimate suggests there are at least 3 million people in the U.S. with OUD. Many people with an OUD problem will eventually wind up in jail.
When a patient with OUD is booked into a jail, the first order of business from a medical perspective should be to treat opioid withdrawal. Opioid withdrawal is a serious medical condition. Patients withdrawing from opioids suffer mightily and without treatment, some will die. The most effective drug that can be used to treat opioid withdrawal is buprenorphine. However, since buprenorphine is itself an opioid, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has placed administrative obstacles to its easy use in jails. Fortunately, the alpha-agonist drug clonidine (Catapres) is not regulated by the DEA and is also effective in treating opioid withdrawal. Either way, treating opioid withdrawal is time intensive. These people are sick!
In my experience, treatment for withdrawal typically lasts 5 to 6 days (but can vary by drug). However — and this is very important — treatment for withdrawal has not addressed the patient’s underlying addiction. If nothing further is done, essentially all patients will return to opioid use as soon as they get out of jail (the average jail stay at my facilities is 2 to 4 weeks). And patients with OUD released from jail have an especially high risk of dying from inadvertent overdose.
So, why not treat OUD patients for their addiction while still in jail?
The two main medications for OUD (MOUD) are methadone and buprenorphine. As opposed to treating withdrawal for 5 to 6 days, MOUD must persist for months or years and be coupled with classes, groups, and counselling in order to be effective. MOUD clinics that offer the whole package, including therapy, can be found in most cities in the form of methadone clinics or community buprenorphine programs. Since most OUD patients will be in jail for less than a month, the best course of action, by far, would be to treat the patient’s initial opioid withdrawal using buprenorphine and simultaneously enroll that patient in a community buprenorphine treatment program. This way, they can seamlessly continue treatment in the community when they are released from jail.
The advantages of treating opioid addiction in jails using MOUD are huge. Patients are much less likely to return to using heroin or fentanyl upon release from jail. They are much less likely to die from an overdose. Treated patients are much less likely to commit other crimes (burglary, for example) to get money for their drug habit. They are much less likely to get needle-borne infections like hepatitis C and HIV. They are more likely to not return to jail.
This makes so much sense, so the question at hand is: “Why aren’t we already doing this now?”
Well, some jails (and prisons) are, but most American jails are not. The reasons for a specific jail not offering optimal medical therapy for their OUD patients vary, but include:
The common denominator of why not to offer MOUD in jails is money. To run an effective buprenorphine program in a jail, most jails need more nursing hours, more space to put the patients in the program, more medical practitioner hours to prescribe the medication, and so on. In addition, the community buprenorphine program needs funding for their time spent enrolling jail patients, beginning counselling and classes in the jail, and planning for release.
Right now, it is illegal to use any federal funds (Medicaid, Medicare, VA benefits, and so on) for drug treatment in jails. And I know from experience that obtaining the necessary funding for a jail drug treatment program from county commissioners is a tough sell. The Biden proposal would help solve this funding gap in those states that adopt it. My own state, unfortunately, has not done so. It’s time for more momentum nationwide.
Filed under: General Problems | 3 Comments »